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Introduction
There is an important tradition of analyzing U.S. political career paths, jumpstarted several decades ago by Joseph Schlesinger (1966) . That study, focusing on the U.S. Congress, offered a typology of "ambitions" that drive various political careers: "progressive" ambition (the officeholder aspires "to attain an office more important than the one he now seeks or is holding"), "static" ambition (a politician wishes to "make a long career out of a particular office"), and "discrete" ambition (the politician desires an "office for its specified term" only and intends to "withdraw from public office"). Many later studies built upon this typology (Hibbing 1982 (Hibbing , 1991 Squire 1988 Squire , 1998 . Herrick and Moore (1993) further refined it by adding the notion of "intrainstitutional ambition," "the members' desire for leadership positions within their present institution" (Herrick and Moore, 1993: 765) .
The literature on Congress and on career paths of politicians, which until recently was largely centered on the U.S. case, has in the last several years been enriched by a number of contributions studying legislatures around the world. Within those developments, Latin American legislatures, which share some basic constitutional features with the U.S. case, have received some attention. One important book by Morgenstern and Nacif (2002) has set the agenda by emphasizing several unique characteristics that make the United State more of a special case. Many assumptions taken for granted in the "Congressional" literature become variables when seen in Latin American perspective, that is, when applied to congresses with lower levels of institutionalization than the U.S. Congress. 1 In particular, in many Latin American cases, legislators are not "single-minded" reelection seekers, and sometimes positions in the National Legislature are just a stepping stone in more convoluted careers that imply moving back and forth between national and local levels (Samuels, 2003; Botero, 2008; Lodola, 2009 ).
There is a parallel literature analyzing the legislative activity and "effectiveness" of (mainly) U.S. legislators, utilizing various objective and subjective measures of the work realized by legislators. A recent study by Padró I Miquel and Snyder (2006) relates some of 1 Recent contributions to the study of political career paths in Latin America include Altman and Chasquetti (2005) for Uruguay, Samuels (2003) for Brazil, Botero (2008) for Chile and Colombia, Jones et al. (2002) for Argentina, and more recently Alcántara Saez (2008) with data from the Project on Latin American Parliamentary Elites (PELA) for the whole region. Siavelis and Morgenstern (2008) study the process of political recruitment and candidate selection, with country chapters by specialists on Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Uruguay.
those measures of legislative effectiveness to incumbent's electoral success and to the probability of legislators moving to higher office.
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In this paper we contribute to the literature studying legislative performance and political career paths in the context of the Argentine case. We utilize a new dataset with various measures of legislative "effort" by Argentine politicians, and we relate this effort to political success, as measured by reelection, becoming a leader of the House, and moving to higher political positions. We find that more effort is associated with a higher probability of being reelected, and also that for those legislators that are reelected, higher effort is positively associated with acquiring leadership positions in the House. This happens in a context of fairly high legislative turnover and in a political context in which career paths of legislators are largely dictated by provincial party leaders. Interestingly, we find that higher legislative effort is associated with a lower probability of improving politically outside Congress. These findings suggest the presence of various alternative career paths for Argentine politicians, and some degree of sorting. The paper concludes with some speculation on these politician types and with ideas for further research.
In the next section we provide some contextual information on the Argentine political system, necessary to interpret the empirical analysis that follows.
Congress and Political Careers in the Argentine Political System
Argentina, which returned to democracy in 1983, is a federal republic consisting of 24 legislative districts: 23 provinces and an autonomous federal district. The National Congress has two chambers, the Chamber of Deputies (i.e., the House of Representatives) and the Senate. This study focuses on the House. Argentine deputies are elected using proportional representation in multimember districts (provinces) with a median district magnitude of 3 and a mean of 5.
2 Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) provide a very rich study of political careers in the U.S. Congress utilizing econometric techniques from labor economics. They show that Congressional experience increases later wages both in the public and private sector, but at a decreasing rate. They distinguish among "types" of politicians, who differ both in their tastes for different aspects of the rewards from office and in their skills. Politicians differ both according to observed characteristics (e.g., age, educational background, family background, party affiliation, and prior political experience) and unobserved or "latent" characteristics. The two latent characteristics are: i) political skill (i.e., politicians are either "skilled" or "unskilled") which refers to the ability to win elections; and ii) the politician's political ambition or desire for legislative accomplishment. During the period under analysis Argentine politics was dominated by two political parties, the Partido Justicialista (PJ, the Peronists) and the Union Civica Radical (UCR, the Radicals). National-level third parties, sometimes on the right, sometimes on the left, achieved some ephemeral success, but tended to vanish after one or two elections.
3 There are also a number of provincial-level parties that occasionally reach the provincial governorship and a few congressional seats at the national level (Sin and Palanza, 1997) .
Recent scholarship on the Argentine political system has tended to argue that the National
Congress is a rather weak policymaking arena, even in Latin American comparative perspective (Spiller and Tommasi, 2003 and Inter-American Development Bank, 2005; Saiegh, 2010) .
As documented in Molinelli, Palanza, and Sin (1999) and Jones et al. (2002) , the careers of Argentine legislators are short, and most Argentine legislators spend just a single term in Congress. The median deputy serves only one term in office. The brevity of Argentine legislative careers does not seem to be driven by the decision of voters to "throw the rascals out," but by the decision of whoever makes up the party lists for Congress not to re-nominate most incumbents. Some authors have explored the process of preparation of the lists of candidates to the National Chamber, most notably De Luca, Jones and Tula (2002) and Jones (2008) . The main conclusion of such analyses is that the process is heavily centered at the provincial level, with a very important role of local political machineries. Even though there is some interprovincial variation (with things slightly different in some of the largest districts), in the median Argentine province, a small click of provincial party leaders has the largest influence on candidate nomination. This influence is stronger in the cases in which the party dominates the provincial executive, in which case the provincial governor plays a central role (De Luca, Jones and Tula, 2002; and Jones, 2008) .
It is in this context of a (supposedly) rather weak national congress, low reelection rates, and political careers centered in the provinces (from where candidates are entered in closed party lists), that we study the effects of legislative effort on being reelected, climbing to House leadership, and moving up to more desirable offices. 
Data, Statistical Methods, and Results

Data
Our dataset contains information on House representatives for the period 1983 to 1995. 5 The dataset was constructed based on official registries of the Congress and on the Directorios Legislativos published by Fundacion Directorio Legislativo.
We are interested in the determinants of three political outputs: reelection in the House (Reelected), becoming a leader of the chamber (Leader, defined as president or vice-president of the chamber, chair of a committee, and majority or minority president or vice-president), and improving politically outside Congress (Improved position, defined as becoming president or vice-president of the country, governor or vice-governor of a province, national senator, national minister, or provincial minister).
Summary statistics are presented in Table 2 . In the period 1983 to 1995, only 20 percent of incumbents were reelected, about 14 percent of representatives held a position of leadership in Congress, and 5 percent went on to political positions considered better than being a Representative. (2011) . We believe that these metrics, while noisy, do serve as proxies for different and relevant dimensions of legislative effort. In order to draw general conclusions in a context of multiple effort measures, we construct an index of legislative effort that aggregates the four measures described above. The index is constructed using the principal component (which accounts for 40 percent of the total variance). We have performed all the empirical exercises reported below also using the individual measures of effort, and the results are quite similar across measures, except when explicitly noted.
Our data also includes various legislator individual and political characteristics, such as age at the time of entering the House, seniority, the total number of legislators that entered the House representing the district (Size), and a series of dummy variables equal to one when the legislator: is male, is a lawyer, and holds a college degree other than lawyer.
As reported in the lower panel of 
Statistical Methods
We aim to estimate the following regression model:
where Y it is the output (Reelected, Leader, and Improved position) of legislator i in term t, E is effort, γ is the parameter of interest, X is a matrix of legislators' characteristics, and ε is the error term. A typical concern when conducting inference for the estimated parameters of equation (1) is that the errors for the same legislator might not be independent across terms. To address this concern we report all standard errors clustered at the legislator level. 6 The number has increased after a law mandating a 30 percent gender quota was adopted in 1991. 7 It is worth clarifying f or U.S. readers that in Argentina a law degree is attained at the "college" level. There are few Argentine legislators with graduate studies (Palanza, Scartascini and Tommasi, 2012) .
Results
Table 3 presents estimates on the relationship between effort and the probability of been reelected. In columns (1) in Table 3 we report OLS estimates of equation (1). In this model, Effort has a positive and significant coefficient suggesting a positive correlation between effort and the probability of reelection. These results provide evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis that effort pays. In columns (2) to (5) we show that the findings are robust to controlling for district and party dummies, and also to estimating equation (1) using a Probit specification. The size of the effect appears considerable relative to the effects of other observable characteristics. Reelection is positively correlated with seniority and negatively correlated with age. The positive connection to seniority and negative connection to age are common results in other contexts (Hibbing, 1982; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997) . In the more-studied context of long U.S. congressional careers, legislators become more likely to retire as they age, while they tend to be reelected more often when they have already served more terms. This latter result should not interpret causally, since it might reflect unobservable characteristics.
Having established that legislative effort seems to pay in terms of reelection, we now explore whether legislative effort is related to climbing to leadership positions in the House.
Herrick and Moore (1993) have expanded Schlesinger's typology to add a fourth type of "intrainstitutional" ambition, the desire for leadership positions within the House, "a unique form of ambition that results in behaviors distinct from those generated by either progressive or static ambition" (1993: 766). We construct a variable called "leader," which is defined as being president or vice-president of the chamber, chair of a committee, or president or vice-president of a majority or minority bloc within the Chamber. We regress this dummy variable on the same variables as in Table 3 for the subset of legislators who were reelected. Table 4 suggests that conditional on being reelected, effort is positively correlated with becoming leader of the House. Notes: Standard errors clustered at the legislator level are in parentheses. For the Probit model we report marginal effects. *Significant at 10%; **Significant at 5%; ***Significant at 1%. Table 5 reports estimates on the relationship between effort and the probability of improving politically after leaving Congress (i.e., becoming president or vice-president of the country, governor or vice-governor of a province, national or provincial minister, or national senator). Strikingly, effort is negatively correlated with the probability of improving politically after leaving Congress. 
Career Paths and Types of Argentine Legislators
Of course a full analysis of career paths of Argentine politicians is beyond the scope of this paper, but we believe that we add a little brick to that broader enterprise through the empirical exercises just described. What these results suggest, when put in conjunction with some ancillary knowledge of the Argentine case, is that there are (as argued in other cases) various alternative career paths in Argentine politics. Most Argentine legislators (around two-thirds) are neither reelected nor move to the most desirable higher positions of President, Vice-President, Senator, Governor, Vice-Governor, or National or Provincial Minister. There are other legislators, though, who tend to be reelected, some of them two and three times. These reelected legislators tend to be overrepresented among leaders of the House (48 percent of the leaders are legislators who have been reelected). These legislators tend to be those who work harder in Congress. Finally, there are some politicians who pass through Congress, tend not to stay there very long, and then move along to better political positions. These politicians tend to work less than their counterparts while in Congress. This is consistent with the view of Argentine politics in the extant literature, which argues that the House, unlike in cases like the United States, tends not to be a very desirable place for ambitious politicians.
In this analysis we do not have all the detailed information about prior career paths, 9 nor a complete analysis of later career steps, but we provide an interesting glimpse into some aspects of those political careers from the perspective of what is that these politicians do while in the Argentine House of Representatives.
Looking into the positions held by Argentine National Deputies immediately after the end of their term in office, Jones (2008) finds that a number of them (30 percent) move to positions (other than the top ones) at the subnational level (such as lower tier executive branch, mayor, and municipal cabinet minister or councilor). If we add those to the ones that stay in National
Congress representing the province and that move to high positions in the province, we find evidence of the provincial-centeredness of political careers to which various previous authors have referred Jones, 2008; Micozzi, 2009; Ardanaz, Leiras, and Tommasi, 2012) . 10 Also, this and the information on previous careers is consistent with the depiction of Jones et al. (2002) that most Argentine legislators are "amateur legislators" but "professional politicians," and Congress is not the centerpiece of their careers.
Focusing on those legislators who do get reelected, we can observe that even though long congressional careers are rare in the Argentine Chamber, there are a few legislators that do have such careers. Within the time frame of our empirical analysis, there were a total of 693 legislators (83 percent) who served only one term, 118 (14 percent) who served two terms, 21
(2.5 percent) who served three terms, and only one legislator who served four terms. 11 We have explored the characteristics of those legislators who tend to serve longer terms.
Focusing on the 22 who served more than two terms, we do find some interesting patterns. These legislators tend to be well known but not "superstar" politicians. They tend to serve on fewer committees (that is, to be more specialized), tend to be assigned to those committees considered most central to Argentine politics (Budget, Foreign Affairs, Agriculture, Housing, Industry, Social Security, Defense, General Legislation, Labor), and tend to reach leadership positions in the House more often (even in their initial terms as legislators). The places in the lists they tend to enter, for the cases of the larger provinces (where lists are not trivially short), have a mode around the third and fourth place. In general, they are not salient enough to be the top name in the list, yet they are important enough that the parties want to make sure they get (or stay) in Congress. It would not make sense to ask the same question for those districts that elect only two, three, or four deputies at each round. As a matter of fact, we find that these long-lived legislators tend to come from large districts more often than not: 17 out of the 22 (or 77 percent) are from the four largest districts (while these districts have 51 percent of the total deputies in the House).
All of this suggests that, in spite of the relative weaknesses of Argentine Congress and of the relative weakness of national-level parties in comparative perspective, parties still manage to have a small cadre of "professional legislators" who tend to be the ones in charge of interacting with the Executive in the most important matters such as the budget. 12 In line with the interpretation of the workings of the Argentine Congress by Jones and Hwang (2005) who argue that, in spite of the provincial-centeredness of political careers, national parties still manage to work as legislative cartels, our findings suggest that some of these strong (but not superstar) legislators are the ones providing most of the important work over time. It is not surprising that this partisan public good is provided primarily by large districts, for which there is more substitution across political types given their larger contingents. Clearly, these are educated guesses, and more research on this is needed.
Coming to those 54 politicians that after their stint in Congress move on to better positions (including important candidacies, whether they won or not), there are a few things that our preliminary analysis suggests. First, their stay in the House tends to be brief. The majority of these achievers stayed only one period in the House, a few of them stayed two periods, and only three of them stayed three periods (including the leader of the right-wing third party, A.
Alsogaray, who was a losing Presidential candidate). That also indicates that there is little overlap between the political "stars" and those politicians who stay long in Congress, suggesting the presence of sorting among politicians. Furthermore, these tend to be political actors that are more "salient" and well-known by the general public, which is reflected in the fact that they tend to occupy higher positions in the party lists than most legislators and, in particular, than the "specialists" who stay longer in Congress. Sixty one percent of the progressing politicians appeared first in their lists, and 80 percent of them appeared in the top two places in their lists.
Conclusion
In this paper we explore the connection between legislative effort and the career paths followed by legislators. We find that, in a party list system, and in a political context of a relatively weak national Congress and low overall reelection rates, still, legislators who "work harder" tend to be reelected more often. Furthermore, we find that among those reelected, the ones that put more effort are more likely to achieve leadership positions. On the other hand, we find that legislative effort is negatively related to moving up to better political positions.
Taking all these results together, and with the use of some ancillary information of the case, we believe that we are glimpsing at diversified career paths. Most people who pass through Congress stays only one period and then move (back?) to other political positions (they are professional politicians although amateur legislators). A small number of legislators have longer stints in Congress. These tend to be skilled legislators, mainly from large districts, who tend to serve in important committees, work harder, and are more likely to achieve leadership positions within the House. Finally, some political stars, after serving a brief stint in the House, move up to more desirable political positions. Interestingly, these politicians who progress beyond the House are the ones that work less while in Congress (at least as measured by the legislative activities we analyze in this paper).
Even though the paper leaves many important questions unanswered, it does provide some insights into the workings of political career paths, legislative organization and political parties in Argentina in a way that also pushes a comparative agenda on these issues beyond the better-studied U.S. case.
